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1. Introduction 
 
 Trust and trustworthiness are key concepts for the analysis of economic systems. At 
the same time their theoretical justification represents a challenge for the model of self-
seeking economic agent. To deal with this issue, some economists describe trust and 
trustworthiness as a pair of strictly related concepts, the so-called t-pair (Bacharach, Guerra 
and Zizzo 2001). This interpretation postulates that a utility-maximizing individual is 
expected to be trustworthy if he does not have economic incentives to take advantage of the 
trust of others. The consequence is that he will trust another one if the incentives of the trustee 
to be trustworthy are self-evident or self-enforceable.  
 A different approach is to assume that trust and trustworthiness may depend on 
different factors. This hypothesis is particularly appropriate for one-shot interactions in which 
factors like reputation and experience are ineffective. In this case trust and trustworthiness 
may be the consequence of distinct motivations or also the product of different behavioural 
regularities. Trust could be perceived as an economic investment in the trustee’s reliability 
and consequently as a decision dependent on risk attitude or on the perception of the 
vulnerability to the action of others. Trustworthiness would seem to be better explained by 
institutional, psychological or moral factors, as social distance or inequality aversion, and it 
could be justified by extra-economic values. 
 Nevertheless, both trust and trustworthiness may be the result of altruistic preferences. 
If utility increases in other individuals’ utility or consumption the truster can find rational to 
trust even if he does not expect the trustee to be trustworthy. Similarly, the trustee may exhibit 
trustworthiness without any economic incentive to reciprocate.  
 To detect the effect of altruism, Cox (2002) and (2004) propose an across-subjects 
experiment that discriminates between transfers resulting from trust or trustworthiness and 
transfers resulting from altruistic preferences. Cox’s findings confirm that subjects are also 
moved by altruistic preferences. His conclusion is that utility should not be assumed 
independent of other individuals’ payoffs and altruistic preferences should be included in the 
rational model of economic behaviour.  
 This theoretical objective requires an investigation of the factors explaining altruism. 
Laboratory activity offers a possible clue to address this question. There is wide experimental 
evidence that men and women behave differently in relation to trust and trustworthiness. This 
result may be useful not only to analyse gender differences but also for discriminating among 
the causes of trust and trustworthiness.  
 To provide some insight into both these issues, we replicate Cox’s (2002) experiment 
on gender differences by modifying the information given to the subjects. Our test specifically 
intends to find evidence on the difference between women and men in altruism when subjects 
playing the trust game are informed of partners’ gender. 
 The next section surveys the past experimental work on gender differences in the trust 
game and then summarizes some theoretical interpretations of the collected evidence. The 
third section illustrates the design of our experiment whose results are presented in the fourth 
section. Finally, in the last section we draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Background  
 
 To test trust and trustworthiness in the laboratory, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) 
propose the trust (or investment) game that involves two players who are paired off 
anonymously and respectively named as the sender and the responder. The sender is given a 
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certain amount of money and told that he or she can keep the entire amount or send some or 
all of it to the responder. Any money passed from the sender to the responder is tripled by the 
experimenter and then given to the responder. The responder can keep the entire amount or 
give back some or all of it to the sender. The game ends when the sender receives the amount 
sent back by the responder.  
 This game-theoretical framework offers a simple measure of the propensities to trust, 
which is the proportion of the initial endowment sent by the sender, and to be trustworthy, 
which is the ratio between the amount returned and the amount received by the responder. In 
the seminal Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe’s paper senders sent 51.6% of their initial 
endowment and responders returned to the senders about 18% of the received money. In the 
following years the trust game was the object of many experimental papers, some of which 
also investigated the differences between male and female behaviour. In this section we 
survey first the evidence on trust and then that on trustworthiness. In both cases we discuss 
separately the experiments in which participants did not know the gender of their partners and 
those in which participants received that information. 
  
Trust with unknown gender 
 
  In the standard trust game, Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2004) find that men trust 
more (74%) than women (61%) These figures are significantly higher than those of Berg, 
Dickhaut and Mc Cabe (1995) and of other replications. Cox’s (2002) proportions of amount 
sent are 64% for men and 53% for women, Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov’s (2003) figures are 
47% and 41% and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan’s (2002) 53% and 34%. It is noteworthy that 
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan adopt a design in which all subjects play the double role of 
sender and receiver. 
 Women are also less likely to send than men in Snijders and Keren (1999) and in 
Eckel and Wilson (2004), in which subjects select their partners by means of icons chosen to 
represent them but that do not reveal their gender. Finally, in an experiment collecting data 
from different countries (China, Japan, Korea and the United States) Croson and Buchan 
(1999) find a slight but non significant difference between men and women in sending 
behaviour (respectively, 69% and 63%). 
 While in all the previous cases men send more than women, Cox and Deck (2002) in a 
reduced version of the trust game with discrete choices find contradictory patterns of 
behaviour between men and women. Their paper also provides evidence of a different 
sensitivity to the experimental environment between men and women. Men’s choices do not 
depend on reciprocal considerations, the level of payoffs, or the social distance, as measured 
by the degree of anonymity between subjects. Women’s decisions are significantly inversely 
related to the social distance and to the relative cost of trusting behaviour.  
 
Trust with known gender 
 
 Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2004) inform subjects of the partners’ gender by 
communicating their names. In the full information condition - both senders and responders 
know the opponent’s gender - women (63%) are less likely to send than men (79%) but they 
send more to male (67%) than to female responder (58%). In general, women appear more 
responsive than men to the change of information conditions as measured by the range of sent 
amounts, which is $1.22 for men and $1.47 for women.  
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 Schwieren and Sutter (2003) also communicate gender by announcing subjects’ first 
name. They don't find any significant difference either between men (65%) and women (65%) 
or between mixed and same gender pairings. 
Feshtman and Gneezy (2001) signal participants’ gender by using first and last names. 
Their work analyses the joint effect of gender and ethnicity. Their findings are that men 
discriminate differently between men and women in function of the ethnic background for 
both trust and trustworthiness while women discriminate only for trustworthiness. Apart from 
that, there are no significant differences for sending behaviour between men and women.  
 In a discrete version of the trust game - the sender decides only if to send all or none 
of the endowment - Eckel and Wilson (2002) test subjects’ behaviour when differently 
informed of the gender of the counterpart. Their outcome is that women send less than men 
with written information and send more than men when they observe a photo of their partner. 
Women are less likely to be trusted than men in the written information treatment, but equally 
likely to be trusted in the photo treatment. 
 Scharlemann et al. (2001) communicate gender by showing to subjects a smiling or a 
non-smiling photo of the partner. Men trust more and discriminate more between the two 
information conditions than women. This experiment also finds support to the gender pairing 
effect, according to which participants trust more other gender’s partners.  
 Finally, Slonim (2004) gives subjects the possibility of selecting the partner on the 
basis of his or her gender. Results show that men send significantly more than women in 
almost all the information conditions.  
 
Trustworthiness with unknown gender  
 
 Croson and Buchan (1999) find that trustworthiness, as measured by the ratio between 
the amount returned and the amount received by responders, is significantly greater for 
women (37.4%) than for men (28.6%). The proportion of money returned is positively related 
to the amount sent: it increases by one third per each additional dollar and this ratio is 
increased by 12% for women. This finding is explained by Croson and Buchan in terms of 
reciprocity rather than of altruism by taking into account the post-experimental 
questionnaires. When asked how obligated they feel to return to the sender the money 
received, women felt significantly more compelled than men to do so.  
 Buchan, Croson and Solnick’s (2004) results with unknown gender are that men 
(24%) return less than women (32%). The same result is found by Chaudhuri and 
Gangadharan (2002). However in this case the difference between women’s and men’s 
amount returned (respectively, 19.8 and 14.7) is not significant by using either parametric or 
non-parametric tests. Chaudhuri and Gangadharan also find that for women the amount 
returned is significantly more correlated with the amount sent than for men.  
 On the contrary, Cox’s (2002) experiment on gender differences finds than men return 
slightly more (40%) than women (39,5%) and show a significantly positive correlation with 
the amount received while female subjects do not. Other evidence of men’s higher 
trustworthiness is provided by Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2003) in an experiment run in 
Russia, South Africa and United States (27.3% for men and 25.7% for women). 
 
Trustworthiness with known gender  
 
 In the full information condition with participants knowing partner’s gender, Buchan, 
Croson and Solnick (2004) find no difference between women’s (33%) and men’s (33%) 
proportions of amount returned. However, their data exhibit the gender pairing effect: while 
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men’s trustworthiness is not affected by sender’s gender, women are more trustworthy to 
male senders (36%) than to female senders (29%).  
 Schwieren and Sutter (2003) find that women (37%) are significantly more reciprocal 
than men (31%) and return more to male senders (45% vs. 30-33% of the other pairings) 
 Lastly, in Eckel and Wilson (2002)’s experiment with the written information and the 
photo treatment there is no significant gender difference neither among treatments nor among 
pairings. 
  
 As for gender differences as a whole (Camerer 2004, Eckel and Grossman 
forthcoming), the laboratory evidence on the trust game is hardly conclusive but it points out 
some recurrent patterns providing the background for further experimental work. These 
regularities can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) the rational backward-induction prediction (no amount sent) is rejected in the lab for 
both genders and all information conditions; 
b) men send more than women, especially with unknown gender; 
c) women return more than men and appear more reactive to the change of experimental 
conditions; 
d) mixed gender pairings increase both trust and trustworthiness. 
 
 This evidence can be interpreted according to various theoretical approaches. A first 
explanation is given by the rational approach (Rabin 1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) that 
introduces additional arguments to the standard utility function. The standard hypothesis is to 
assume that economic agents’ preferences are defined on their own and other agents’ payoffs. 
For our purposes, this view would imply that male and female different behaviour can be 
rationalized by appropriate adjustments to the respective utility functions.  
 Another rational-like interpretation of this experimental evidence is given by the 
transformed-payoffs theory (Geanakoplos et al 1989, Guerra and Zizzo 2001) according to 
which rational players play psychological games. In these games the primary payoff is 
replaced with transformed payoffs. These payoffs are expressed in terms of player’s 
secondary utility, which is a function of his or her belief about other players’ beliefs on 
players’ choices. Responders would fulfil trust not for perceived kindness or inequality 
aversion but because they believe senders trusts them. For the gender issue, this approach 
would mean that women are more trust responsiveness because they believe more than men 
that senders intended to trust them. Gender differences in trusting behaviour would be 
explained by symmetrical reasons. As for the rational approach, this interpretation postulates 
that trust and trustworthiness are strictly related. 
  A third explanation relies upon the dynamics of cognitive processes (McCabe et al. 
2001, Rustichini 2005). Rather than viewing trust as something to be built into formal models, 
the cognitive approach argues that a different understanding of trust and trustworthiness could 
be provided by an analysis of the relations between behavioural regularities and structures and 
functions of the brain. The study of the different levels of brain activation would reveal the 
anatomical underpinnings of individuals’ behaviour. For the gender issue, it would imply that 
men have acquired a functional ability different from women that justifies gender differences 
in trust and trustworthiness. 
 Finally, the psychological approach (Riley and Babcock 2002, Ostrom 2003) connects 
behavioural regularities to the context in which decision are taken. This view tends to 
differentiate between factors explaining trust and trustworthiness. For example, trust could be 
explained in terms of the psychological mechanisms activated in conditions of uncertainty, as 
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negativity bias or cognitive consistency (Eiser and White 2005). On the other hand, 
trustworthiness would be explained in terms of norms, which are defined as valuations - 
internal to the strategic situation - of a certain choice. Women would tend to interpret the 
economic exchange more communally and empathically and thus to repay trust with 
trustworthiness in return more than men. Female behaviour would exhibit more 
trustworthiness because women’s preferences are more other-regarding than men’s. 
 Our experiment intends to provide some evidence on whether trust and trustworthiness 
depend on different factors. Specifically, we initially assume that while senders interpret the 
decision to trust mainly as an economic investment, responders are trustworthy mainly 
because they have altruistic preferences. The corroboration of this hypothesis would be 
helpful in explaining gender differences in the trust game. Women would be more trustworthy 
because they are more altruistic than men. In contrast, the role of risk aversion in trust would 
make the decision of trusting strictly dependent on subjects’ competitive attitude. If men 
perform better than women in competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini 
2005) this interpretation could explain the fact that men trust more than women.  
 Another experimental finding we emphasize is women’s higher sensitivity to the 
changes in the laboratory environment. In a survey on gender differences in the lab, Croson 
and Gneezy argue that “this variance (gender difference) can be explained by a differential 
sensitivity of men and women to the social conditions in the experiment. Research from 
psychology suggests that women are more sensitive to social cues in determining appropriate 
behavior than are men. (…) Participants of both genders are likely maximizing an underlying 
utility function, but the function that men use is less sensitive to the conditions of the 
experiment, information about the other party, and (even) the other party’s actions, than the 
function that women use.” (Croson and Gneezy 2004, p. 19)  
 According to this view, women would be more sensitive than men to the experimental 
context, i.e. face-to-face interaction, design variations or information about the partner. When 
Cox (2002) applies its design to detect gender differences in the trust game, he chooses not to 
inform participants of partner’s gender. Our experiment modifies Cox’s design exactly in this 
point by testing trust and trustworthiness with known gender. We expect that this feature of 
the design will increase the differences of reactivity between men and women and 
consequently highlight the gender effect. 
 Finally, the surveyed evidence shows that men and women may behave differently 
depending on partner’s gender. According to the theory of parental investment (Trivers 1972), 
individuals would be more cooperative against the opposite sex than within the same sex for 
evolutionary reasons. The relevance of gender pairing in bilateral relationships is supported 
by an experiment made by Sutter, Bosman, Kocher and van Winden (2003), who find that 
cooperation is lower with bargaining partners of the same gender. We decided to inform 
subjects of partner’s gender also to collect evidence on this hypothesis.  
 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
 The main purpose of our experiment, which is to detect differences in altruism 
between genders in the trust game, was not extensively analyzed in the laboratory, as pointed 
out in the previous section. The only exception is the design proposed by Cox (2002) and 
(2004) that decomposes transfers resulting from trust or trustworthiness and transfers 
resulting from altruistic preferences that are not conditional on the behaviour of others. This 
design includes three treatments, A, B and C, with a between-subjects design in which each 
subject takes part to only one treatment.  
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 Treatment A is the standard trust game. Each responder is given 5 euros as 
participation fee. Each sender receives 5 euros in half units and is given the task of deciding 
how many to transfer to the paired responder. The amounts transferred are tripled by the 
experimenter and given to the paired responder. Each responder decides whether she or he 
wants to return some, all, or none of the amount received to the paired sender and the game 
ends. In this treatment the decisions of both sending and giving back money are also 
attributable to altruistic preferences but this determinant is not distinguishable from the 
subjects’ attitudes to trust or to be trustworthy.  
 Treatment B is a dictator game which differs from treatment A only because 
responders do not have any decision to make, while senders decide as in treatment A. In 
treatment B senders do not have any motivation to send related to trust because they do not 
expect any money back. In our interpretation, any amount of money sent by senders to the 
paired man or woman can be ascribed to altruistic preferences. 
 Treatment C is another dictator game in which senders do not move while responders 
decide how much money to send to senders. Subjects’ initial endowments are calculated as 
follows. Senders receive an amount of money equal to that hold by the senders in the 
experiments of treatment A after having taken their sending decisions. Responders are given 
as initial endowment the (tripled) amounts of money received by responders in the 
experiments of treatment A. Both senders and responders are informed with a table of the 
exact inverse relation between the endowments received by responder and by the 
anonymously paired sender. Thus each responder will transfer part or all the initial 
endowment only if his or her preferences are altruistic because the sender cannot send back 
anything. 
 The comparison between these treatments gives an across-subjects measure of 
altruism. In particular, the degree of altruism in trusting decisions is measured by the ratio 
between the proportions of the initial endowment sent by the senders to the responders in 
treatment A and in treatment B. The degree of altruism in trustworthiness is measured by the 
ratio between the proportions of amounts of money transferred to senders by responders in 
treatment A and in treatment C.  
 To exemplify, the lowest degree of altruism in trust occurs if senders do not send any 
money in treatment B and any amount of money sent in treatment A is attributable to trust. 
Higher is the ratio between the average amount sent in treatment B and the average amount 
sent in treatment A greater is the degree of altruism. The same calculation on the proportions 
between the amount sent and the amount received by responders in Treatment A and C gives 
an estimation of the degree of altruism in trustworthiness. 
 We modify Cox’s design by imposing that partner’s gender is known both by senders 
and responders. Consequently we had to decide how to inform subjects of partner’s gender 
and we chose to communicate the gender by naming each subject “man” or “woman”.1 The 
same information can be conveyed by making known participants’ proper names but this 
option can be criticised for two reasons. The first is that proper names have an evocative 
meaning and hence may unconsciously influence subjects’ behaviour in a way that is hardly 
predictable. The second is that anonymity may be not guaranteed if the experiment involves 
no cheating and names are real names.2 Although we acknowledge that to communicate the 
partner’s gender by means of the labels “woman” or “man” may intensify the focus on 
gender, we assess it as a minor drawback. 
                                                 
1 Innocenti and Pazienza (2004) focused on how experimenter’s gender influences players’ behaviour. 
Also in that case we test the trust game with known gender by naming each subject man or woman. 
2 On this point see Dufwenberg and Muren (2003) and Slonim (2004). A different view is expressed 
by Holm (2000). 
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 The experiments were carried out between March and October of 2005 and concerned 
216 subjects, 108 women and 108 men. All the subjects were first and second year 
undergraduate students from the University of Siena and from the University of Firenze, 
recruited from economics courses through billboards posted on the web and around the 
university campus. The experiments were run manually and the participants were paid 
according to the euros earned. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. 
 
Table 1 Summary of the experimental design 
Session Treatment Participants  (women + men) 
1 A 12 + 12 
2 A 12 + 12 
3 A 12 + 12 
4 B 12 + 12 
5 B 12 + 12 
6 B 12 + 12 
7 C 12 + 12 
8 C 12 + 12 
9 C 12 + 12 
Total  108+108 
 
 We ran all treatments with the double blind procedure. It was made clear to subjects 
that in all the sessions neither the experimenters nor other subjects were able to attribute 
individual choices to individual people. To guarantee this anonymity, all subjects were 
initially directed to an isolated desk to make their decisions privately. Then, subjects received 
the written instructions that were read aloud by the monitor. 
 In treatment A when the experiment began, senders were given a large unmarked 
envelope which contained the money to be invested (5 euros which could be transferred in 
steps of half units), the “identification card” marked with the identification number and the 
partner’s gender (“woman” or “man”), a small envelope and two “gender cards” marked 
respectively with the word “man” or “woman”. Senders were asked to remember their 
identification numbers. Also receivers were given a large unmarked envelope which 
contained the fee (5 euros) and a card marked with the identification number. The 
correspondence between each number and each participant remained unknown to the other 
participants and to the experimenter and this was made clear to the participants. 
 Once senders had decided how much money to send to their partners in the small 
envelopes, they had to insert the identification cards in the smaller envelopes. Moreover, each 
subject had to insert the appropriate gender card corresponding to his or her gender. The 
sealed envelopes were collected in a closed urn by the monitor and were taken to the 
experimenters in a separate room. After having recorded the amount sent and tripled it, the 
experimenters marked each envelope with the number identifying a receiver of the 
appropriate gender. The envelopes in the closed urn were delivered again by the monitor to 
the subjects’ room. At this time, responders were called one at a time by the monitor. Once 
called, each responder had to privately choose the envelope with her or his identification 
number from the urn placed on an isolated desk. Then he or she came back to his or her place. 
Having decided how much of the received money to return to the sender, responders sealed 
their envelopes. The monitors collected again the envelopes in the closed urn and took them 
to the experimenters’ room, where the experimenters recorded the amounts returned and gave 
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the envelopes back for distribution to senders by the same procedure used before. When the 
experiment was over, all subjects left the room without revealing their identities to anyone. 
 The other two treatments followed the same double blind procedure. In treatment B 
the procedure stopped after the sending decision. In treatment C all the subjects also received 
the table reporting the pairs of the amounts of money received by responders and senders and 
the procedure ended after the transfer of money from the responders to the senders. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
 Our experiment intended to test the following two hypotheses that concern the effect 
of altruism on subject’s behaviour in the trust game: 
 
H.1 Women are more altruistic than men as both sender and responder. 
 
H.2 Mixed gender pairings exhibit a higher level of altruism in the decisions both of 
trusting and of being trustworthy. 
 
 We first analyze sender’s decisions to measure the degree of altruism in trust and then 
responder’s decisions that determine the degree of altruism in trustworthiness. 
 The results of treatment A (Table 2) confirm the very common finding that men trust 
more and are less trustworthy than women. On average, men send more than women (55.6% 
and 28.9%, respectively) and women return more than men (20.2% and 12.5%). However, the 
t-test and the non parametric Wilcoxon test show that the difference between genders is 
statistically significant only for trust.  
 
Table 2 Trust and trustworthiness in treatment A (average values) 
TRUST TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Sender's 
gender 
Amount 
sent 
Amount sent/ 
Endowment N. 
Responder's 
gender 
Amount 
returned 
Amount 
returned/Amount 
received 
N. 
Female 1.4 28.9 18 Female 1.9 20.2 16 
Male 2.7 55.6 18 Male 0.9 12.5 17 
Total 2.1 42.2 36 Total 1.3 16.2 33 
T-test for equality of means  T-test for equality of means  
T 3.93  T -1.07  
Sign. Value 0.02  Sign. value 0.29  
N-PAR Wilcoxon  N-PAR Wilcoxon  
Wilcoxon 234  Wilcoxon 260  
Sign. Value 0.02  Sign. value 0.32  
 
 Figure 1 records the amount sent and returned by each pair. Three subjects send 
nothing and three subjects send all their endowment. Among the thirty-three responders who 
receive a positive amount of money, twelve subjects do not return anything. Three responders 
give back more than the amount sent by the senders. 
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Figure 1 Subjects’ decisions in treatment A sorted by amounts sent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 Table 3 reports the average amounts sent by 18 males and 18 females in the treatment 
B. Male subjects send again more than female subjects (25.6% for men and 18.3% for 
women).3  
 The comparison between treatments A and B gives a measure of altruism in trust, that 
is determined by the ratio between the amount sent in treatment B and the amount sent in 
treatment A. Women exhibit a degree of altruism in trust higher than men. The ratio between 
the female and male altruism (respectively, 63.9% and 46.0%) is equal to 1.39. 
 
Table 3 Amounts sent in treatments A and B by gender (average values) 
 Treatment A Treatment B 
 Amount sent  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount sent 
/ Endowment N. 
Amount 
sent 
Dev. 
St. 
Amount sent / 
Endowment N. 
Female 1.44 (1.19) 28.9% 18 0.92 (0.79) 18.3% 18 
Male 2.78 (1.24) 55.6% 18 1.28 (1.18) 25.6% 18 
All 2.11 (1.37) 42.2% 36 1.10 (1.00) 21.9% 36 
 Amount sent Tr. B / Amount sent Tr. A  
(Altruism) 
Female 63.9% 
Male 46.0% 
All 52.1% 
 
 These results can be summarized by means of a tobit estimation of the model (Table 
4): 
 
 Si = c + αDTi + βDSi + εi 
                                                 
3 The difference in the amount sent between genders is significant in treatment A at 99% while it is not 
statistically different from zero in treatment B.  
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In the equation above Si is the amount sent in treatments A and B (censored for 0 and 5), DTi 
is a treatment dummy (DT=0 for treatment A and DT=1 for treatment B) and DSi is a gender 
dummy (DS=0 for men and DS=1 for women).  
 
Table 4 Tobit regressions of gender differences in treatments A and B
Number of obs. = 72 LR chi2(2) = 19.85  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  Log likelihood = -114.67847  Pseudo R2 = 
0.0796   
        Coeff.    Std. Err.       t             P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  α -1.125 0.314 -3.57 0.001 -1.75353 -0.4974943
  β -0.990 0.315 -3.14 0.002 -1.619317 -0.3621984
  C 2.593 0.270 9.58 0.000 -2.053975 -3.133496
Observations summary: 9 left-censored obs. at amount returned ≤ 0; 59 uncensored obs.; 4 right-censored obs. at 
amount sent ≥ 5 
 
 The estimation gives evidence of trust because the negative α coefficient is significant. 
Senders’ behaviour is significantly differentiated between genders as showed by the negative 
value of the β coefficient.  
 Visual inspection of Figure 2, which reports the amounts sent by female and male 
subjects grouped by the transfers of half units, confirms the conclusion of the tobit regression. 
 
Figure 2 Senders’ decisions in treatments A and B sorted by gender and amount sent 
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 Finally, we analyse the effect of gender pairing on subjects’ behaviour in treatments A 
and B. Gender pairing has a significant effect only in treatment B (Table 5), in which senders 
paired with responders of the other gender send more than senders matched with same gender 
responders (25.0% and 18.9%, respectively). More significantly, mixed pairings exhibit a 
higher degree of altruism (60.1%) than same gender pairings (44.1%). 
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Table 5 Amounts sent in treatments A and B by gender pairings (average values) 
 Treatment A Treatment B 
 
Amount 
sent  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount sent 
/ Endowment N. 
Amount 
sent 
Dev. 
St. 
Amount sent / 
Endowment N. 
Mixed 2.08 (1.32) 41.7% 18 1.25 (0.73) 25.0% 18 
Same 2.13 (1.46) 42.8% 18 0.94 (1.22) 18.9% 18 
All 2.11 (1.37) 42.2% 36 1.10 (1.00) 21.9% 36 
 Amount sent Tr. B / Amount sent Tr. A  
(Altruism) 
Mixed 60.1% 
Same 44.1% 
All 52.1% 
 
 Turning to the analysis of treatment C (Table 6), we find that women return more than 
men (21.3% vs. 7.6%) and this difference is statistically significant. 
 Being responders endowed with the same amount of money in treatments A and C, the 
comparison between the two treatments gives a measure of the degree of altruism for 
trustworthiness, that is the ratio between the amount returned in treatment C and the amount 
returned in treatment A. Women exhibit more altruism (90.0%) than men (55.2%) and the 
ratio between the two values is 1.64. The t-test shows that the difference between genders in 
treatment C is statistically significant (t=3.35, p=0.002).  
 
Table 6 Amounts returned in treatments A and C by gender (average values) 
 Treatment A Treatment C 
 
Amount 
returned  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount returned/ 
Amount received N. 
Amount 
returned  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount returned / 
Amount received N. 
Female 1.88 (2.68) 20.2% 16 1.68 (1.34) 21.3% 16 
Male 0.85 (1.08) 12.5% 17 0.47 (0.65)   7.6% 17 
All 1.35 (2.05) 16.2% 33 1.06 (1.20) 14.2% 33 
 Amount returned Tr. C / Amount returned Tr. A 
(Altruism) 
Female 90.0% 
Male 55.2% 
All 78.5% 
 
 Following Cox (2002), we run two tobit estimations of the model 
 
 Ri = c + αVari + βSi + εi, 
 
in order to discriminate between amount returned due to other-regarding preferences and 
amount returned due to positive reciprocity. In the equation above Ri is the amount returned, 
which is censored between 0 and 15, Si is the amount received, Vari is computed given by 
multiplying a treatment dummy DT by the amount sent (Vari = Si·DT, where DT=1 for 
treatment A and DT=0 for treatment C). 
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Table 7 Tobit regressions of amount returned in treatments A and C by gender 
Men 
Number of obs = 34  LR chi2(2) = 11.37   Prob > chi2 = 0.0034   Log likelihood = -39.1638 
        Coeff.    Std. Err.       t             P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  α 0.348794 0.210453 1.66 0.107 -0.07989 0.777474
  β 0.557361 0.245938 2.27 0.03 0.056401 1.05832
  c -1.25843 0.581275 -2.16 0.038 -2.44245 -0.07442
Observations summary: 16 left-censored obs. at amount returned ≤ 0; 16 uncensored obs.; 2 right-censored obs. at 
amount returned ≥ 3 
Women 
Number of obs. = 32    LR chi2(2) = 9.73    Prob. > chi2 = 0.0077      Log likelihood = -59.24727  
        Coeff.    Std. Err.       t             P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
  α 0.144684 0.272998 0.53 0.6 -0.41285 0.702221
  β 0.963728 0.340364 2.83 0.008 0.268612 1.658843
  c -1.27247 0.935356 -1.36 0.184 -3.18272 0.637785
Observations summary: 8 left-censored obs. at amount returned ≤ 0; 23 uncensored obs.;   1 right-censored obs. At 
amount returned ≥ 9 
 
 The tobit regressions exhibit a positive correlation between the amount returned and 
the amount received, as showed by the β coefficients of both genders (Table 7). The value of 
the α coefficient, which measures the differences in subjects’ reactivity between the two 
treatments, is not significantly different from zero for women. The same coefficient is 
different from zero at 89.3% for men and this supports the hypothesis of positive reciprocity. 
Moreover, for men the estimate of the constant c is negative and significantly different from 
zero, and this result leads to exclude pure other-regarding preferences.4 
 Figure 3a and 3b reports the amounts returned respectively by female and male 
subjects sorted by the amounts received in treatments A and C. 
 
Figure 3a Amounts returned in treatments A and C by amounts received 
Female subjects
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
0 0 1,5 3 4,5 4,5 4,5 6 6 7,5 7,5 7,5 9 9 10,5 13,5 15 15
Amount returned
sum_rest A
sum_rest C
 
                                                 
4 Cox (2002) reports a greater difference between genders. While women exhibits a positive and 
significant constant and other coefficients not different from zero, supporting the hypothesis of other 
regarding preferences, for men the estimation gives a constant not different from zero and significantly 
positive coefficients for α and β, which support the hypothesis of positive reciprocity. 
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Figure 3b Amounts returned in treatments A and C by amounts received 
Male subjects
0,0
0,5
1,0
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2,0
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3,5
0 1,5 3 3 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 6 6 6 6 7,5 10,5 12 15
Amount returned
sum_rest A
sum_rest C
 
 Finally, we consider the effect of gender pairing in trustworthiness. Table 8 reports 
that mixed pairs return more than same gender pairs only in Treatment A (19.0% and 13.2%, 
respectively). On the contrary, in Treatment C the order between the pairs is reversed (12.9% 
and 15.6%, respectively). The resulting degree of altruism is greater for same gender pairings 
than for mixed pairings (97.1% vs. 66.7%). 
 
Table 8 Amounts returned in treatments A and C by gender pairings (average values) 
 Treatment A Treatment C 
 
Amount 
returned  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount returned/ 
Amount received N. 
Amount 
returned  
Dev. 
St. 
Amount returned / 
Amount received N. 
Mixed 1.59 (2.63) 19.0% 16 1.06 (1.38) 12.9% 16 
Same 1.09 (1.21) 13.2% 17 1.06 (1.01) 15.6% 17 
All 1.35 (2.05) 16.2% 33 1.07 (1.20) 14.2% 33 
 Amount sent Tr. C / Amount sent Tr. A 
 (Altruism) 
Mixed 66.7% 
Same 97.1% 
All 79.3% 
 
 By summarizing our findings, Hypothesis H.1 was confirmed by the comparison 
among the three treatments. Women exhibit a higher degree of altruism than men both for 
trust and trustworthiness, but the ratio between female and male altruism is greater for 
trustworthiness (1.64) than for trust (1.39). This result supports the thesis that women are 
more trustworthy than men because trustworthiness is more related to altruism than trust. 
Hypothesis H.2 was not supported by the data. Mixed gender pairs exhibit a higher degree of 
altruism than same gender pairs for trust but not for trustworthiness. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
 This paper provides experimental evidence against the t-pair assumption according to 
which the decisions of trusting and of being trustworthy are directly related. Most laboratory 
work on the trust game shows that women send less than men when playing as senders and 
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return back more than men as responders. We claim that this behaviour can be better 
explained by the fact that women are more altruist than men. Being trust mainly dependent on 
risk aversion and trustworthiness on altruism, differences in altruism explain gender 
differences in the trust game. 
 Our findings support this hypothesis. Women result more altruistic than men both for 
trust and trustworthiness. Moreover, the difference between genders in the degree of altruism, 
which is given by the across subjects comparison between the trust game and two dictator 
games in which senders and responders do not reciprocate, is greater for trustworthiness than 
for trust.  
 This result departs from Cox’s (2002) findings, according to which men and women 
exhibit a nearly equivalent degree of altruism. In that experiment gender differences in 
altruism were not statistically significant for trust and only men exhibited significant positive 
reciprocity. Our test differs from Cox’s because participants were informed of partner’s 
gender. We conjecture that if women are more sensitive than men to the experimental context 
this change could have highlighted gender differences. 
 Lastly, we find mixed evidence on the gender pairing effect. The hypothesis that 
mixed pairs are more cooperative than same gender pairs and implement more efficient 
outcomes when trust is needed is not supported by our data. 
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Appendix 
Instructions (translation from Italian) 
  
 Treatment A 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The Ministry of University and 
the University of Siena have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to 
read are self-explanatory. Two of us have been chosen as monitors and will check that the instructions 
are followed as they appear here. However, they will not answer any questions during this experiment. 
If you have any doubts, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the experiment has 
begun, we ask that you do not talk, at all, during this experiment. If you follow these instructions 
closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be given to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
All the participants to the experiment will be divided in two groups, players A and players B. 
Each player A will be paired with a player B. You will not be told who the person you are paired with 
is either during or after the experiment. The only information you will have is the gender of the person 
to which you are paired with. Neither the monitors and the experimenters nor the other participants 
will be able to associate your choices to your name. Whatever decision you will take it will remain 
totally anonymous.  
Each person will be given 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment. Each player A will 
have the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all or none of their show-up fee to the player B 
which he is paired to. The amount sent will be tripled. For example, if player A sends an envelope that 
contains 2 euros, the envelope will contain 6 euros when it is given to the paired player B. If you send 
an envelope that contains 4 euros, the envelope will contain 12 euros when it is given to the paired 
player B. The player B will then decide how much money to send back to the paired player A and how 
much money to keep and the game will end. 
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how the experiment is organized. 
These instructions are structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the monitors, will 
know the personal decision of people. Since your decision is absolutely private, we ask that you do not 
tell anyone your decision during the experiment. 
The experiment is conducted as follows. Each of one will extract from a closed urn taken by 
the monitor a ticket that indicate if he or she is Player A or Player B. Then the other monitor will place 
a number of large unmarked envelopes in a closed box. Each of these envelopes contains 5 euros, two 
identical “identification cards” marked with a number that you are asked to remember during all the 
experiment, a “gender card” marked with the word “woman” or “man” and a small envelope. Then 
monitors will call each player A at a time to go to the isolated box placed in the back of the room. 
 17
Each person possessing the ticket “player A” will take an unmarked envelope from the box and will 
come back to his or her isolated desk. 
 Then he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and wrote on the two identification 
cards the letter W if he is a woman or the letter M if he is a man. Please do not forget to include this 
information. Then each player A will place as many euros in the smaller envelope as he or she wants, 
keeping the rest. Examples: (a) put 2 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 3 euros; (b) put 4 euros in 
the smaller envelope and keep 1 euro. These are examples only; the actual decision is up to each 
person. It is important to keep in mind that the person who received the amount you sent will be a 
female if the word “woman” is written on the received gender card and a male if the word “man” is 
written on the received gender card. 
Once each player A has made the decision, he or she will put the smaller envelope, one of the 
two identification cards and the gender card in the larger envelope. Then the monitors will call one 
player A at a time to go to the isolated box. Each person will put the larger envelope into the box. 
Notice that each returned envelope will look exactly the same and neither monitors nor others will be 
able to attribute individual choices to individual subjects. 
After all the envelopes have been put in the return box, one of the two monitors will take the 
box in a separate room where the experimenter, one at a time, will take the smaller envelopes out of 
the larger envelopes, record on a sheet of paper the letter and the number written on the identification 
card and the amount of money inside the smaller envelope. Then the experimenters will triple the 
amount of money found in the smaller envelope, place the smaller envelope back into the larger 
envelope, and write an identification number out of the larger envelope. At this point, the 
experimenters will transfer again the envelopes in the return box. 
The monitors will then take back the box to the experiment room and call one player B at a 
time to go to the isolated box to retrieve the larger envelope with his or her identification number 
marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until every player B has 
retrieved his or her appropriate envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, 
monitors will ask if every player B has retrieved the correct envelope. If all the players B have taken 
the correct envelope, then the experiment will continue. If, however, an envelope has ended up with 
the wrong person, then the monitors will call one player B at a time again and the process will repeat 
until everyone has the correct envelope. 
Then each player B will privately open the larger envelope and must decide how many euros 
to leave in the smaller envelope. The player B keeps the remaining euros. The smaller envelope should 
then be placed again in the larger envelope. When everyone has had the opportunity to make his or her 
decision, the monitors will call again one player B at a time. Each player B will return the larger 
envelopes to the isolated box. The monitors will then take back the box to the experimenters who will 
open the larger envelopes and record how much is in the smaller envelope. The experimenters will put 
the smaller envelopes in the larger envelopes, and the monitors will take them back in the experiment 
room. 
Then monitors will call one player A at a time to go to the isolated box to retrieve the larger 
envelope with the appropriate identification number marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. 
This process will continue until everyone has retrieved his or her envelope and returned to his or her 
seat. When everyone is finished, monitors will ask if every player A has retrieved the correct 
envelope. If the people have all taken the correct envelope, then the experiment is finished. If, 
however, an envelope has ended up with the wrong person, then the monitors will collect all the 
smaller envelopes again and the process will repeat until everyone has the correct envelope. 
At this time, you should take all your belongings and leave the experiment room when you are 
done. When everyone in the room has left, the experiment is over, and the monitors will be paid for 
their participation. 
 
 Treatment B 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The Ministry of University and 
the University of Siena have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to 
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read are self-explanatory. Two of us have been chosen as monitors and will check that the instructions 
are followed as they appear here. However, they will not answer any questions during this experiment. 
If you have any doubts, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the experiment has 
begun, we ask that you do not talk, at all, during this experiment. If you follow these instructions 
closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be given to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
All the participants to the experiment will be divided in two groups, players A and players B. 
Each player A will be paired with a player B. You will not be told who the person you are paired with 
is either during or after the experiment. The only information you will have is the gender of the person 
to which you are paired with. Neither the monitors and the experimenters nor the other participants 
will be able to associate your choices to your name. Whatever decision you will take it will remain 
totally anonymous.  
Each person will be given 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment. Each player A will 
have the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all or none of their show-up fee to the player B 
which he is paired to. The amount sent will be tripled. For example, if player A sends an envelope that 
contains 2 euros, the envelope will contain 6 euros when it is given to the paired player B. If you send 
an envelope that contains 4 euros, the envelope will contain 12 euros when it is given to the paired 
player B. 
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how the experiment is organized. 
These instructions are structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the monitors, will 
know the personal decision of people. Since your decision is absolutely private, we ask that you do not 
tell anyone your decision during the experiment. 
The experiment is conducted as follows. Each of one will extract from a closed urn taken by 
the monitor a ticket that indicate if he or she is Player A or Player B. Then the other monitor will place 
a number of large unmarked envelopes in a closed box. Each of these envelopes contains 5 euros, the 
“identification card” marked with a number, a “gender card” marked with the word “woman” or 
“man” and a small envelope. Then monitors will call each player A at a time to go to the isolated box 
placed in the back of the room. Each person possessing the ticket “player A” will take an unmarked 
envelope from the box and will come back to his or her isolated desk. 
 Then he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and wrote on the identification card 
the letter W if he is a woman or the letter M if he is a man. Please do not forget to include this 
information. Then each player A will place as many euros in the smaller envelope as he or she wants, 
keeping the rest. Examples: (a) put 2 euros in the smaller envelope and keep 3 euros; (b) put 4 euros in 
the smaller envelope and keep 1 euro. These are examples only; the actual decision is up to each 
person. It is important to keep in mind that the person who received the amount you sent will be a 
female if the word “woman” is written on the received gender card and a male if the word “man” is 
written on the received gender card. 
Once each player A has made the decision, he or she will put the smaller envelope, the 
identification card and the gender card in the larger envelope. Then the monitors will call one player A 
at a time to go to the isolated box. Each person will put the larger envelope into the box. Notice that 
each returned envelope will look exactly the same and neither monitors nor others will be able to 
attribute individual choices to individual subjects. 
After all the envelopes have been put in the return box, one of the two monitors will take the 
box in a separate room where the experimenter, one at a time, will take the smaller envelopes out of 
the larger envelopes, record on a sheet of paper the letter and the number written on the identification 
card and the amount of money inside the smaller envelope. Then the experimenters will triple the 
amount of money found in the smaller envelope, place the smaller envelope back into the larger 
envelope, and write an identification number out of the larger envelope. At this point, the 
experimenters will transfer again the envelopes in the return box. 
The monitors will then take back the box to the experiment room and call one player B at a 
time to go to the isolated box to retrieve the larger envelope with his or her identification number 
marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until every player B has 
retrieved his or her appropriate envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, 
monitors will ask if every player B has retrieved the correct envelope. If all the players B have taken 
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the correct envelope, then the experiment will continue. If, however, an envelope has ended up with 
the wrong person, then the monitors will call one player B at a time again and the process will repeat 
until everyone has the correct envelope. 
Then each player B will privately open the larger envelope and take the euros found in the 
smaller envelope. At this time, all the participants should take all your belongings and leave the 
experiment room. When everyone in the room has left, the experiment is over, and the monitors will 
be paid for their participation. 
 
 Treatment C 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The Ministry of University and 
the University of Siena have provided funds to conduct this research. The instructions you are about to 
read are self-explanatory. Two of us have been chosen as monitors and will check that the instructions 
have been followed as they appear here. However, they will not answer any questions during this 
experiment. If you have any doubts, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the 
experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk, at all, during this experiment. If you follow these 
instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an amount of money that will be 
given to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
All the participants to the experiment will be divided in two groups, players A and players B. 
Each player A will be paired with a player B. You will not be told who the person you are paired with 
is either during or after the experiment. The only information you will have is the gender of the person 
to which you are paired with. Neither the monitors and the experimenters nor the other participants 
will be able to associate your choices to your name. Whatever decision you will take it will remain 
totally anonymous.  
Each player B will be given 5 euros as a show-up fee for this experiment plus another amount 
of money that he or she will have the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all or none of their 
show-up fee to the player A which he is paired to. Each player A will be given an amount of money 
that depends on the amount of money received by the sum received by the player B whom he or she is 
paired with. For example, if player B receives 6 euros in addition to the show-up fee, the paired player 
A will receive 3 euros. If player B receives 12 euros in addition to the show-up fee, the paired player 
A will receive 1 euro. These are examples only; the actual decision is up to each person. All the 
possible pairs of initial endowments of players A and B will be shown in a sheet that each player will 
be given during the experiment.  
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how the experiment is organized. 
These instructions are structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the monitors, will 
know the personal decision of people. Since your decision is absolutely private, we ask that you do not 
tell anyone your decision during the experiment. 
The experiment is conducted as follows. Each of one will extract from a closed urn taken by 
the monitor a ticket that indicate if he or she is Player A or Player B. Then the other monitor will place 
a number of large unmarked envelopes in two closed boxes. Each of these envelopes contains an 
amount of money, the sheet indicating the possible pairs of initial endowments of players A and B, the 
“identification card” marked with a number, a “gender card” marked with the word “woman” or 
“man” and a small envelope.  
 Then monitors will call each player A at a time to go to one of the isolated box placed in the 
back of the room. Each person possessing the ticket “player A” will take an unmarked envelope from 
the box and will come back to his or her isolated desk. 
 Then he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and wrote on the identification card 
the letter W if he is a woman or the letter M if he is a man. Please do not forget to include this 
information. Then each player A will take the euros he or she finds in the envelope. 
 Then monitors will call each player B at a time to go to the other the isolated box placed in the 
back of the room. Each person possessing the ticket “player B” will take an unmarked envelope from 
the box and will come back to his or her isolated desk. 
 20
 Then he or she will privately open the unmarked envelope and wrote on the identification card 
the letter W if he is a woman or the letter M if he is a man. Please do not forget to include this 
information. Then each player B will place as many euros in the smaller envelope as he or she wants, 
keeping the rest. It is important to keep in mind that the person who received the amount you sent will 
be a female if the word “woman” is written on the received gender card and a male if the word “man” 
is written on the received gender card. 
Once each player B has made the decision, he or she will put the smaller envelope, the 
identification card and the gender card in the larger envelope. Then the monitors will call one player B 
at a time to go to the isolated box. Each person will put the larger envelope into the box. Notice that 
each returned envelope will look exactly the same and neither monitors nor others will be able to 
attribute individual choices to individual subjects. 
After all the envelopes have been put in the return box, one of the two monitors will take the 
box in a separate room where the experimenter, one at a time, will take the smaller envelopes out of 
the larger envelopes, record on a sheet of paper the letter and the number written on the identification 
card and the amount of money inside the smaller envelope. Then the experimenters will transfer again 
the envelopes in the return box. 
The monitors will then take back the box to the experiment room and call one player A at a 
time to go to the isolated box to retrieve the larger envelope with his or her identification number 
marked on it. Do not open your envelope yet. This process will continue until every player A has 
retrieved his or her appropriate envelope and returned to his or her seat. When everyone is finished, 
monitors will ask if every player A has retrieved the correct envelope. If all the players A have taken 
the correct envelope, then the experiment will continue. If, however, an envelope has ended up with 
the wrong person, then the monitors will call one player A at a time again and the process will repeat 
until everyone has the correct envelope. 
Then each player A will privately open the larger envelope and take the euros he or she finds 
in the smaller envelope. At this time, all the participants should take all your belongings and leave the 
experiment room. When everyone in the room has left, the experiment is over, and the monitors will 
be paid for their participation. 
